The People's Republic of China is the world's second largest economy. Beginning in the 1980s, substantial economic growth combined with political and regulatory changes led to a dramatic increase in non-performing loans. By the turn of the century, 1/4 of loans held by Chinese banks were overdue. This article examines how China managed its non-performing loans, discusses bad debt in China today, and provides suggestions for how it should tailor its non-performing loan strategy as its economy continues to slow.
INTRODUCTION
The amount of non-performing loans ("NPLs") held by a nation's financial institutions is a strong indicator of its economic stability and the risks associated with the infrastructure of its banking industry. Although Chinese NPLs only constitute approximately one percent of the People's Republic of China's ("China" or "PRC") total gross loans, 1 this one percent of the world's second largest economy constitutes more than 96 billion USD. 2 The manner in which China addresses NPLs held by PRC banks will have significant effects on its financial services industry. These two perspectives are almost identical. The only significant difference is that a financial institution may record a loan as idle before three years have passed.
However, as there is generally little to no overlap between when the institution has to declare its NPLs and when the three year date accrues, this difference does not have a significant impact on Chinese NPL practices. Additionally, the practical effects are minimal because (1) this is merely changing the category of NPL, as opposed to determining whether a loan is non-performing, and (2) as discussed below, the majority of China's NPLs are held by a select few financial institutions that are regulated by the same agencies.
It is important to remember that this three year period does not determine when a loan becomes non-performing. As discussed above, Chinese loans are categorized as NPLs once the date in the loan agreement passes and there are outstanding payments. period for a cause of action to accrue for lack of payment, which is currently two years, then a loan may be deemed as a bad loan if the court determines that the lender will not be able to recover due to lack of funds or bankruptcy. 23 Additionally, a loan will be considered a bad loan if a debtor is subject to criminal proceedings that strip him or her of assets, resulting in the inability to pay off the loan. Debates, 1991 -1998 , PROQUEST (2008 1999-2000. 57 In 1999, China established four asset management companies ("AMCs") to manage its NPLs: Changcheng ("Great Wall"), Dongfang ("Orient"), Huarong, and Xinda ("Cinda"). 58 Various government ministries and other financial institutions funded China's AMCs, which then purchased NPLs from its banks. 59 These four
AMCs primarily manage NPLs through debt equity swaps, auctions, and bids. Much like the US, which created the RTC to purchase and collect on NPLs, Japan established the Resolution and Collection Corporation ("RCC") and Industrial
Revitalization Corporation of Japan ("IRCJ"). 85 For the NPLs that these agencies did not acquire, the Japanese government set standards and goals for NPL management.
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These efforts reduced the percentage of NPLs to total loans from around 10 percent to two percent in roughly five years. Many of China's SOEs not only made profits, but relied heavily on state-owned banks to fund their operations. 88 Since both the banks and SOEs were owned by the government, and the government needed the banks to provide credit in order to allow its companies to run, these banks made loans to SOEs despite their knowledge that the loans would probably not be repaid. 89 As these loans were not repaid, Chinese See id. art. 10. (potential risk = normal risk for asset class * 1.5% + concerned class's asset risk * 3% + secondary risk for asset * 30% + doubtful class's asset risk * 60% + losing class's asset risk * 100%) ("潜 在风险估计值=正常类风险资产×1.5%+关注类风险资产×3%+次级类风险资产×30%+可疑类风 险资产×60%+损失类风险资产×100%").
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See id. art. 12.
continues by analyzing the causes of NPLs in the PRC. It then discusses China's current potential NPL problems, and provides a brief hypothetical implementation of the US's and Japan's NPL strategies in China.
AnalyzingChinese Non-Performing Loans

A. Causes
China accumulated a massive amount of NPLs by the beginning of the 21 st century.
The causes of this rise in NPLs are not solely connected to its loan industry. Rather, they demonstrate many of the economic, legal, and political issues that were especially prevalent in China during the 1990s.
Although "China" has existed for thousands of years, the PRC was established in However, China's economy was already developing at a massive rate by the 1990s.
Its laws and regulations were not sufficient to properly manage its booming economy, which led to problems including inadequate loan practices. Additionally, the PRC focused its efforts on promoting SOEs. This caused its financial institutions to make loans to these SOEs, regardless of whether they would be able to pay those loans.
After a few years, these loans were classified as non-performing, leading China to address the problem after realizing that over 25 percent of its loans were not being paid.
B. Current Issues
There are two current issues that take center-stage in China's NPL market: (1) how to resolve its remaining outstanding NPLs and (2) the potential increase in NPLs as China's economy slows.
i. Outstanding Non-Performing Loans
Although only one percent of the PRC's loans are non-performing, China holds approximately 96 billion USD in outstanding debt. This remaining one percent is mostly composed of older NPLs that China's financial institutions, including its AMCs, were unable to resolve. This signifies that there is a very low possibility that China's financial institutions will receive any meaningful return on these loans.
It is probable that a small fraction of these NPLs will be resolved. However, it is unlikely that most of their value will be recovered. In consideration of China's history of bailing out companies, especially SOEs, the PRC may simply write off the remaining NPLs. On the other hand, the government's perceived willingness to write off bad debt is one of the main reasons that some debtors are holding off repaying their loans.
ii. Potential Increase in Non-Performing Loans as Economic Growth Slows
Both the US and Japan experienced the greatest increase in NPLs when their economies slowed after a period ofsubstantial growth. Japan resorted to more drastic measures because (1) it had more liberal regulations during its growth and (2) its economy slowed at a faster rate. Generally speaking,China's accumulation and management of its NPLs was a combination of the trends seen in the US and Japan.Although China's loan market was even less regulated than Japan's loan market, it addressed its NPL issues earlier. Also, China's economy continued to exhibit strong growth despite substantial changes.
China may be facing a second wave of NPLs as its economy continues to slow down and stabilize. Unlike its first encounter with a rapid increase in NPLs, where
China's economy continued to grow at over 10 percent per year, the slowing economy will contribute to the number of NPLs as debtors' profits are reduced. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the percentage of NPLs will increase too much due to the current NPL management system and potential aid from the central government.
Implementation of United States Strategy
Although China's AMCs and the US's RTC may appear very different, China based its AMCs partially on the US's method for resolving its NPL problems. The RTC was formed to take over failing banks -managing their NPLs was one of its functions. However, a Chinese bank does not need to be failing to transfer NPLs to an AMC.
The main difference between these institutions is size. The US was able to manage its NPLs by creating the RTC, and it later merged the RTC into the FDIC. In comparison, each of China's Big Four had a large amount of NPLs on its books. As a result, the PRC formed an AMC for each bank.
If China were to reduce the size and/or number of its AMCs, then it would be unequipped to manage the potential rise in NPLs as its economy slows. importance it places on reducing debtor expectations of debt forgiveness.
Reduce Debtor Expectations of Government Write-Offs
Some of China's debtors will hide their assets in order to complicate loan collection, and pretend that they do not have enough assets to ever fully repay the loan.
Unfortunately, they will do so after weighing the risks of not paying their loans with the possibility that the government will forgive their debt. China's government has a reputation of funding SOEs regardless of whether they turn a profit. It has also forgiven large debts in the past, which adds to debtor confidence that it will eventually write off their debt.
The percentage of NPLs connected to debtors that purposely avoid loan repayment is rising. This is due to the simple fact that the loans which are easier to collect have already been settled. It is essential that the PRC reduce debtors' expectations that the government will reduce their debt. As the heightened interest rates for bad debt continues to accrue, debtors become increasingly unwilling to repay their loans. Therefore, time is also an important factor. If the PRC does not reduce debtors' expectations, then writing off their debt may be the only way to remove it from the loan industry.
It would be very difficult for the PRC to reduce debtor expectations of debt forgiveness unless it substantially changes its current system (e.g. downsize AMCs).
However, there are less effective methods that could be used that would not affect its NPL management system. For example, the CBRC and MOF could jointly issue a statement to financial institutions that they will not ask the national government to forgive debtors. Financial institutions could send this statement to debtors, promulgate the statement via brochures and loan documents, and attach a personalized statement for debtors with outstanding loans.
The benefit of this method is that it would have no effect on how China manages its NPLs. At the same time, it would decrease debtor expectations of loan forgiveness.
However, it is unlikely that it would significantly change debtor views of government debt forgiveness because there would be no real change in China's NPL system.
Reduce Preferential Treatment for State-Owned Companies
The PRC has exhibited a strong intermingling between the government and select companies (and families) since 1949. This still exists today in China's banking industry wherein SOEs often receive better treatment than their private counterparts.
Financial institutions have consistently demonstrated more lax lending practices to SOEs. Also, the AMCs were primarily developed to handle NPLs from the Big Four, which are state-owned banks, and most of the debtors for those NPLs were SOEs.
As a substantial portion of China's NPLs come from SOEs, partially because SOEs function in necessary or important but often unsustainable sectors and also due to the practices stated immediately above, the PRC should shift away from distinguishing between private and state-owned companies. A potential way to begin this process in the NPL industry would be for the CBRC to issue a regulation to all financial institutions.
This regulation should begin by stating whether a company is owned by the government or privately owned will not be a factor in how the financial institution interacts with the company. The author only has two recommendations for specific clauses in this regulation. First, it should state that loan practices will be the same for private and state-owned companies. The regulation should also reiterate that a bank may not give a loan to an SOE that it would not give to a private company. Second, the regulation should provide that the management of NPLs will not differ depending on the type of debtor.
Downsize Asset Management Companies
China's AMCs are currently functioning according to the standards set when 25 percent of China's loans were non-performing. As this article mentions, it is likely that the percentage of NPLs in China will rise as its rate of growth slows. However, the amount of China's NPLs probably will not increase more than a few percent.Foreign purchasers of NPLs in China have already substantially reduced their employees or even closed down. On the other hand, the national government may be hesitant to downsize its NPL management infrastructure because of uncertainties surrounding its economy in the near future and local government debt.
First, China's investment strategy is rapidly changing from heavy high-risk investment to promote growth to a secure robust investment strategy with a moderate regulatory atmosphere. This means that reduced investment may cause companies that cannot operate without third party funds to fail. However, it will also promote long-term NPL prevention through regulations that foster reliable business practices.
Second, China's local governments (especially municipal and county) are indebted to the national government. Although the national government will most likely forgive their debt, the close relationship between these governments and local SOEs promotes unsustainable business practices. As a result, this increases the potential for outstanding loans from local companies accustomed to relying on the local government for funding and incentives.
Despite high uncertainty regarding the future of China's NPL market, it is very unlikely that Chinese NPLs will substantially increase. As such, it is the author's opinion is that AMCs should downsize their infrastructure in accordance with their projections of the NPL industry.
CONCLUSION
Despite foreign investors' continued interest in Chinese NPLs due to the high number of outstanding loans, China has successfully mitigated the NPL issues that it experienced in the early 2000s. Currently, NPLs constitute an acceptable amount of China's loan industry. However, the PRC will have to change its NPL strategy to resolve its remaining NPLs. Additionally, it may be beneficial to consider restructuring AMCs pursuant to expectations of the future NPL market. As China's economy slows down, it is likely that it will experience an increased amount of NPLs. This provides opportunities for foreign investors because AMCs will create new NPL portfolios. At the same time, investors should temper their expectations because these portfolios will be substantially smaller than their predecessors.
